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8 
THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE 
CONFLICT SINCE 9/11 
Scott Burchill 
The most concerning but widely predicted consequences of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on N ew York City and Washington were the 
opportunities the strikes and their aftermath afforded governments 
around the world to align their political struggles with domestic 
opponents as part of the 'war against terrorism', 
The best known examples were Russia with Chechen separatists, 
China with the Urgyr in the northwest of the country, Turkey and its 
Kurdish population, India with Muslim rebels in Kashmir, the Algerian 
Government and its political opposition, and Israel versus the 
Palestinians, 
Israel opened its window of opportunity almost immediately after the 
9/11 strikes by sending tanks into Palestinian towns such as Ramallah 
and J enin for the fIrst time, generally increasing its hold on ,the occupied 
territories. This was the chance for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to settle 
some old scores with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian population on 
the West Bank and Gaza. With occasional brief interludes, the violence 
has continued ever since. 
In Australia, which has only a marginal interest in the Israel-Palestine 
dispute, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington instigated a 
change in both rhetoric and policy by the Howard Government. Until 
9/11 there was a pretence of even-handedness towards the dispute, even 
though in reality successive Australian governments had been strong 
supporters of the state of Israel and only belatedly acknowledged that 
Palestinians might have similar rights. After 9/11 much of the pretence 
of even-handedness was abandoned - arguably a victory for honesty in 
diplomacy - although the cost was an independent voice on the 
question. Since Al-Qaeda struck Washington and New York City, the 
position of the Australian Government towards the primary Middle East 
dispute has become virtually indistinguishable from Washington's. 
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Almost immediately after the attacks, the Australian Government 
began to accept the conflation of the defence of Israel with the so-called 
'war on terror'. Attitudes changed as Canberra began to uncritically 
accept Washington's stand that it could be both Israel's strongest, most 
influential ally and a third party mediator in its dispute with the 
Palestinians. For example, Switzerland convened a meeting of the High 
Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention on December 5, 
2001 to discuss alleged Israeli violations of the Convention in its 
treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 (with additional Protocols), sometimes 
called the Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, is 
designed to guarantee special care and protection for civilians under 
wartime occupation, especially children. 
The United States, Israel and Australia - in isolation from the 
international consensus - boycotted the meeting claiming that it was 
another attempt by anti-Israel forces to leverage international agreements 
that have no applicability to the occupied territories. In other words, 
Australia now considered the Israeli-occupied territories as a special case 
to which international law regarding the protection of civilians may not 
apply. It is difficult to imagine Australia boycotting such an important 
meeting before September 2001, or being so out of step with global 
OpInIOn. 
This chapter will focus on two key ingredients of Australian policy 
towards the Israel-Palestine conflict since the 9/11 attacks. The fust is 
what the Howard Government means by an even-handed approach to 
the dispute and how this policy was influenced by the so called 'war 
against terror'. 
The second is how a specific interpretation of the 2000 Camp David 
negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, hosted by Bill 
Clinton, has been used to underwrite Canberra's policy settings in the 
J\.1iddle East. 
Uneven-handedness 
In the month after 9/11, John Howard eloquently summarized his 
Government's approach. According to the Prime :Minister, 'it's even-
handed. Yes we support a Palestinian homeland but there has to be an 
acceptance of, the unconditional acceptance of Israel to peacefully exist 
within secure and defensible boundaries.'l 
There are a couple of important points to note about this formula 
which belie its initial apparent fairness. 
THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT SINCE 9/11 125 
First, there is support for a 'Palestinian homeland' but no mention of. 
a Palestinian state or where it might be. It might be within a pre-existing 
state such as Jordan or somewhere in Africa. 
Secondly, Australia's support for a 'Palestinian homeland' only comes 
after Israel's right to exist 'within secure and defensible boundaries' is 
unconditionally accepted by the Palestinians. Apart from the fact that no 
state within the international system acknowledges another's 'right to 
exist' because it is an unenforceable right (Australia does not 
acknowledge Israel's right to exist which is a very different claim to 
diplomatic recognition), it is clear from the Prime Minlster that Israel's 
needs must be met fIrst. There is no reference to 'secure and defensible' 
boundaries for Palestinians presumably because they are to get what's 
left over after Israel fInally achieves internationally recognized 
boundaries. By defmition this is not even-handed. 
Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. Prime Minister Howard 
speaks 'as the leader of a government that has always been an 
unashamed and unapologetic friend of the State of Israel and the 
maintenance of the integrity of the State of Israel behind secure, 
internationally recognized borders has been a cornerstone of the foreign 
policy of many governments in Australia.'2 
True enough, though no one has ever suggested he needed to 
apologize for his support for Israel and it is equally true that no 
Australian Government has ever given anything like equal support for 
the right of Palestinians to self-determination. On the right of 
Palestinians to resist the occupation of their lands - a right inscribed in 
international law including the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - successive· Australian 
Governments, including I\1:r. Howard's, have been all but silent. They 
have also been mute on related issues such as Israel's 'weapons of mass 
destruction' (WMD) and its disregard of UN General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions. Nor is their any explanation for why Israel 
still does not have 'internationally recognized borders' over half a 
century after its establishment. 
However, the best illustration of just how uneven the Howard 
Government's approach to the Israel-Palestine dispute has been can be 
found in its reaction to Palestinian suicide bombers, who emerged during 
the second intifada· provoked by what President Clinton called Ariel 
Sharon's 'inflammatory escapade' to Temple Mount in September 2000. 3 
The Howard Government has not only been quick to publicly 
condemn each Palestinian suicide attack, it has also factored these attacks 
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into a discourse which seeks to justify Israel's unwillingness to seriously 
negotiate a peace agreement with the Palestinians. 
As Prime Minister Howard was preparing his case for war against Iraq 
in early 2003, he could not escape referring to the cause of much Arab 
hostility towards the West - Washington's support for Israel and its 
direct contribution to the repression of Palestinians via political support 
and credits for military procurements. In his Ministerial Statement to 
Parliament on Iraq in February, the Prime 11inister asked: 'How can the 
Prime Minister of Israel be expected to do these things [negotiate with 
the Palestinian leadership] while ever the murderous pattern of suicide 
bombing continues to be inflicted on the Israelis?'4 This came after an 
earlier expression of understanding for the devastating Israeli attacks in 
the occupied territories when the Prime Minister said 'I think there has 
been an over-reaction by Israel but the over-reaction is understandable 
given the nature of the attacks that were launched on Israel.'s 
There are three points to note about these remarks which give a very 
clear picture of what the Howard Government means by even-
handedness towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
First, why Palestinian violence should end before Israeli violence is 
expected to terminate is never explained, principally because Israeli state 
terrorism is portrayed as responsive rather than proactive. Palestinian 
bombers are described as terrorists while Israel's attacks against 
Palestinian towns are defIned as self-defence. Completely missing from 
Howard's account is any reference to the cause of Palestinian terrorism, 
namely thirty-seven years of brutal and humiliating occupation. For the 
Howard Government it is almost as if Palestinian suicide attacks 
suddenly fell out of the sky with no pre-history, provocation or context 
even worthy of mention. The occupation, if it actually exists, has 
apparently been characterized by Israeli non-violence. It is therefore best 
to commence the narrative of the conflict with the Hrst suicide bombings 
after Sharon's provocative stroll in September 2000. 
References to the occupation seem to be taboo. When asked to 
comment on the illegal Israeli settlements while visiting the region in 
May 2000, Howard said 'I'm not going to express a view on that.'6 When 
referring to historical wrongs perpetrated against Palestinians in a speech 
in July 2003, the Prime Minister spoke of 'a sense of injustice' as if it 
were a debatable issue. 7 And perhaps most remarkable of all was Mr. 
Howard's suggestion that Palestinian claims for liberation constituted a 
'convoluted argument about the alleged dispossession or prolonged 
disputes'.8 The 'alleged dispossession' of Palestinians? One can only 
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wonder how Mr. Howard explains the Palestinian refugee camps in. 
Lebanon and Jordan, for example. The Australian Prime lVlinister has 
shown no reluctance to publicly condemn each instance of Palestinian 
resistance but has been conspicuously silent o'n the occupation which 
sparked them. 
Secondly, Howard's argument is not an in-principle opposition to the 
use of violence per se because he has said that Israeli state terrorism is 
'understandable.' In fact 'state terrorism' as a concept is missing from the 
lexicon of the Howard Government altogether unless it is in reference to 
official enemies such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein when it is freely 
deployed. Israeli missile strikes against Palestinian civilians are routinely 
'understandable,' occasionally an 'over-reaction' or more often simply 
and conveniently ignored entirely. They are never described as a crime 
and little more than 'restraint' or 'moderation' is ever called for when 
publicity about them becomes too widespread to ignore. 9 
When questioned about the assassination of Hamas's spiritual leader 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer declared that 'we don't support targeted assassinations of this 
kind. But let's just keep it in sort of balance - there's a balance here.'lo 
Where there clearly has not been a balance is in the comparative 
reactions of the Australian Government to suicide bombings and what 
are often politely referred to as Israeli 'incursions' into Gaza or the West 
Bank. The former regularly invoke a ministerial reaction, the latter 
infrequently and if so, always reluctantly. Canberra is somehow always 
able to understand Israeli terrorism but never Palestinian violence. 
Thirdly, the Howard Government is effectively calling for a 
Palestinian surrender as a pre-requisite to negotiations. \V'hereas the 
occupation is to be considered as part of a negotiation process and 
withdrawal is not to be a pre-condition, the response to the occupation 
must stop before negotiations even begin. Is that even-handed? \V'hat 
incentive would the Israelis have to compromise? Such a back-down 
would almost certainly be politically suicidal for the weaker side. 
There is no understanding and absolutely no sympathy from the 
Australian Government for the fact that only armed resistance has kept 
the cause of Palestinian nationalism alive. As the African National 
Congress discovered in South Africa, and countless others living under 
occupation in Indochina, North Africa and the sub continent have 
found, when peaceful avenues are blocked and extinction becomes a real 
possibility, armed struggle is regrettably the only last resort. How would 
the Palestinian cause have fared without violent struggle during the 
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1970s, for example, when many Israeli and US leaders denied the very 
existence of the Palestinian people? 
Just as those resisting Western occupation in Iraq are branded 
terrorists, it has long been the fate of Palestinians struggling to liberate 
their own territory from occupation to be similarly branded. They are 
not expected to notice the source of the military hardware that kills them 
at a consistent rate of three to one, or the diplomatic backing for Israel 
in the West. 
It should come as little surprise that when the opportunity for Ariel 
Sharon to align his struggle against the Palestinians with President Bush's 
new 'war against terror', he grasped it with both hands. 
Blaming Arafat 
The strategy is familiar and has been consistently applied. 
By arguing that Yasser Arafat refused an' Israeli offer of 
unprecedented generosity and concession at Camp David in July 2000 -
with claims that he rejected anything between 80 per cent and 98 per 
cent of what he and his people wanted - it was possible to portray the 
Palestinian leader as the obstacle to peace in the Middle East rather than 
as a serious interlocutor with the Israelis. Arafat could be cast as the man 
who again missed an historic opportunity when Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak agreed to give him virtually everything he asked for in 
negotiations hosted by President Clinton in the last days of his second 
term in office. 
This is the argument of the 'friends of Israel' from Greg Sheridan, 
Daniel Mandel and Colin Rubenstein in Australia, to The New Republic, 
The New York Times and The Australian, including its Middle East 
correspondents. 
It remains the official attitude of the Australian Government and the 
regularly invoked explanation for what went wrong in 2001 and who is 
to blame for the subsequent violence. 
According to Prime Minister John Howard, 'when Ehud Barak was 
the Prime Minister of Israel he offered in his peace settlement close to 
90 per cent of the demands of the PLO'. Soon this became '80-90 per 
cent of what they asked for', and a few months later 'Barak's very 
magnanimous offer at Camp David [involved] offering Palestinians 90 
per cent or more of what they wanted, including some involvement in 
Jerusalem'. By 2003 Howard was arguing that 'the great bulk of their (i.e. 
the Palestinians') demands were ultimately repudiated [in 2000]'.11 
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TIlls position has become the Australian Government's standard line. 
in almost all subsequent commentary on the spiralling violence that has 
ensued since the Barak Labour Government was removed from office 
and replaced by Ariel Sharon's Likud-led coalition. In summary, it is all 
Arafat's fault. He was offered a great deal - more than he could 
reasonably expect - and he foolishly knocked it back. Everything that 
has gone wrong since is a direct consequence of Arafat's failure to grasp 
Barak's magnanimous offer at Camp David. 
This orthodoxy has been further strengthened by the publication of 
an insider's account of the negotiations hosted by Bill Clinton in the final 
months of his presidency. According to the foreign editor of The 
Australian, 'Dennis Ross, the chief US negotiator, recounts all this in 
irrefutable detail in his new book, The Missing Peace. The final Israeli offer 
included 96 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza, all the Arab 
neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem and some compensating territory 
from Israel proper for a sovereign Palestinian state.'12 This is similar, 
though not identical, to Clinton's claim that Arafat was offered 91 per 
cent of the West Bank amongst other measures at Camp David, and later 
'parameters' which recommended 94 per cent to 96 per cent of the West 
Bank plus additional negotiated arrangements on Jerusalem and other 
points of contention. 13 
If only Arafat had not missed this historic opportunity the settlers 
would have left peacefully, there would have been a Palestinian state and 
no need for the second intifada with its awful suicide bombings. Instead, 
he walked away from Barak's magnanimity and escalated the terror. The 
onus was now on the Palestinians to make greater concessions. 
Given its prominence within the Howard Government's Middle East 
discourse, it is worth looking more closely at what Arafat was apparendy 
offered by Barak - specifically what he subsequently rejected. A cursory 
review highlights an immediate problem with the argument. It is largely a 
fallacious version of history. 
First, there were no specific proposals from either Israel (Barak) or 
the US (Clinton) at Camp David. Just 'ideas' and later 'parameters.' The 
US and Israel had no official position or deftnitive explanatory maps. 
Eventually some maps were published in Israel and by the highly 
authoritative Report on Israeli 5 ett!ements in the US, largely reconstructed 
from credible Israeli sources. All of the maps confirmed that the West 
Bank would be divided into four isolated cantons separated from the 
Gaza Strip, with its status left vague. Relevant maps can now be found 
and viewed. 14 
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An examination of the maps reveals th'at '] erusalem' is vastly and 
illegally expanded, comprising 5.4 per cent of the entire West Bank and 
is not included in the percentage figure generously claimed by Israel's 
supporters. 1S There is a salient from the city to the east stretching 
virtually to Jericho, and including Ma'ale Adumim, a town established 
mainly by Rabin-Peres-Clinton-Barak to split the West Bank into two 
parts. There's another salient to the north, splitting the remaining 
sections also virtually in two. A small part of East Jerusalem, the centre 
of Palestinian life and the communications centre for the whole of the 
West Bank, is virtually cut off from all of them. Borders are under 
Israel's control, as are resources, most importantly water. 
According to Robert Fisk, Jerusalem was to have remained the 
'eternal and unified capital of IsraeL' Arafat would only have received 
what Madeleine Albright called 'a sort of sovereignty' over the Haram al-
Sharif mosque area and some Arab streets, while the Palestinian 
Parliament would have been below the city's eastern walls at Abu Dis 
and renamed Al-Quds. With the vastly extended and illegal Jerusalem 
municipality boundaries cutting deep into the West Bank, Jewish 
settlements like Ma'ale Adumim were not up for negotiation; nor were 
several other settlements. Nor was the 10-mile Israeli military buffer 
zone around the West Bank, nor the settlers' roads, which would razor 
through the Palestinian 'state'.16 The Jordan Valley was to remain under 
Israeli control until some future unspecified date. 
Discontiguous and encircled cantons, or more accurately bantustans, 
without borders with any country other than Israel; no agreement to 
dismantle or even stop illegal Israeli settlements on Arab lands; a refusal 
to return to the 1967 borders; retention of 'Israeli' bypass roads and 
adjacent lands which intersect the West Bank; no automatic right of 
return for refugees; and still Arafat failed to see the extraordinary 
generosity of the offer. 
In truth, Arafat was offered about 46 per cent of the 22 per cent of 
Palestine (the West Bank) that was left after the establishment of the 
Israeli state. Or to put it more meaningfully, the Palestinian leader was 
being 'offered' by the occupying government about 12 per cent of the 
land from which the Palestinians were driven in 1948. 
Unsurprisingly, Palestinians resented being told how much of their 
land Israel was 'generously' prepared to return to them. Camp David 
must have seemed like sitting down with the burglar and the police to be 
told by both how much of their stolen property they think should be 
returned. Generous 'concessions' indeed. Unsurprisingly, Arafat refused 
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to commit political suicide by accepting such a humiliating and one-sided. 
'deal.' According to Noam Chomsky, 
the Camp David proposals divided the West Bank into virtually 
separated cantons, and could not possibly be accepted by any 
Palestinian leader. That is evident from a look at the maps that 
were easily available, but not in the NIT (New York Times), or 
apparently anywhere in the US mainstream, perhaps for that 
reason. After the collapse of these negotiations, Clinton recognized 
that Arafaes reservations made sense, as demonstrated by the 
famous "parameters", which, though vague, went much further 
towards a possible settlement .... Clinton gave his own version of 
the reaction to his "parameters" in a talk to the Israeli Policy 
Forum on January 7, 2001: "Both Prime l\1inister Barak and 
Chairman Arafat have now accepted these parameters as the basis 
for further efforts. Both have expressed some reservations." 
One can learn this from such obscure sources as the prestigious 
Harvard-WT journal International Security (Fall 2003), along with 
the conclusion that "the Palestinian narrative of the 2000--01 peace 
talks is significantly more accurate than the Israeli narrative .... " 
After that, high-level Israeli-Palestinian negotiators proceed to take 
the Clinton parameters as "the basis for further efforts," and 
addressed their "reservations" at meetings in Taba through] anuary. 
These produced a tentative agreement, meeting some of the 
Palestinian concerns ~ and thus again undermining the official 
story. Problems remained, but the Taba agreements went much 
further towards a possible settlement than anything that had 
preceded. The negotiations were called off by Barak, so their 
possible outcome is unknown. A detailed report by ED envoy 
11iguel Moratinos was accepted as accurate by both sides, and 
prominently reported in Israel. 17 
The new orthodoxy surrounding the Camp David negotiations and 
their aftermath falls apart on close scrutiny; however it has an important 
role to play in the West's explanation for why violence in the region 
continues and who is to blame. As Israeli scholar Tania Reinhart 
explains, 'the myth of generous Israeli offers at Camp David ... is 
nothing but a fraud perpetrated by propaganda ... at Camp David Barak 
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was neither aiming for reconciliation nor genuinely attempting to move 
closer to an end of conflict.'18 
The Howard Government's position on a settlement of the dispute 
subsequently became even more confused. In July 2004 Australia voted 
in the minority against the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
which referred the question of Israel's security/apartheid wall to the 
International Court of Justice (IC]). Adopting Washington's position, 
Canberra claimed it was not appropriate to bring political disputes of this 
kind before the Court, though it is hard to see the ICJ ruling on anything 
other than political matters - its primary function. 
Despite Canberra's refusal to even allow the legality of the wall to be 
judged, Foreign Minister Downer says that he 'would not want the 
barrier to become a de facto border and I have· urged the Israeli 
Government to consider moving the barrier closer to the 1967 line.'19 
This follows an earlier claim that 'we support the green line· being the 
border, the pre-1967 border, as the national border'.2o :Mr. Downer 
seems to be unaware that this position has been explicitly rejected by the 
Sharon Government and is inconsistent mth Prime Minister Howard's 
claim that 'the basis of a settlement must be the Oslo accords,'21 
Conclusion: The Role of Palestinian Leaders 
The Palestinian leadership has always had a very specific role in the eyes 
of the Israeli and US political establishments. It has been to exert 
domestic control over the Palestinian population on behalf of IsraeL The 
character or history of individuals such as Arafat has never mattered. 
Nor has their commitment to democratic processes or a willingness to 
wipe out corruption been key concerns. What has always been crucial 
was whether Palestinian leaders could assert their authority over the 
people in the interests of Israeli security and Washington's regional 
security interests. 
The decision by Washington and Tel Aviv to ignore the only 
democratically-elected leader of the Palestinian people in the last two 
years of his life, together with President Bush's presumption that he 
alone can decide how much of the occupied territories Israel can expect 
to retain, are further indications of how one-sided Western approaches 
to the Israel-Palestine conflict have recently become. Canberra's 
ungenerous response to the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November, 
2004 suggests Australia no longer aspires to an independent foreign 
policy on the Middle East's most intractable dispute, and is content to 
echo Washington's uneven approach. 22 
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It also seems to be the role prescribed and preferred by the Australian 
Government. Shordy before Yasser Arafat's death, Foreign IMinister 
Downer outlined what was expected from his successors: 'In the end 
what we do need from the Palestinian authority is a greater degree of 
authority over their own people, a greater degree of strength in 
controlling security within the Palestinian territories'. 23 But will the 
population do as they are told by those who no longer pretend to be 
even-handed and have only a marginal interest in the conflict? 
